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INTRODUCTION 
What is the societal role of lawyers for vulnerable clients? 
Important literature on lawyering for poor clients explores how 
lawyers might better support the agency, insights, and values of such 
clients.1 Pivoting outward from the internal dynamics between clients 
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 1. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Essay, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning 
Lessons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2110–11 (1991) (proposing an 
“interpretive strategy of retrieving client narratives lost in the lawyer telling of client 
story”); Louise G. Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People: Revisionist Scholarship and 
Practice, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 983, 987–93 (1994) (highlighting the importance of 
attending to discourse, integrating issues of race and gender into individual representation, 
employing client narratives, facilitating community economic development, and redefining 
lawyers’ professional roles); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and 
Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 45–48 (1990) 
(describing lawyer’s subordination of client’s voice and agency). 
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and lawyers, another vital inquiry is what lawyers can and should do 
to promote the interests of their clients in relation to outside forces.2 
Monroe Freedman and Abbe Smith have suggested that “the central 
concern of lawyers’ ethics . . . is how far we can ethically go—or how 
far we should be required to go—to achieve for our clients full and 
equal rights under law.”3 This Article asks whether the answer should 
turn on client vulnerability. 
Part I lays out the basic terms of the discussion. Part I.A borrows 
from Martha Fineman’s theory of vulnerability4 to make the following 
three points. First, vulnerability is ubiquitous, rather than unusual, in 
the human condition. Second, vulnerability varies between people, 
due largely to social and economic forces. Third, given the 
commonality and variability of vulnerability, creation of an equal 
society requires the state to design social structures that acknowledge 
and correct for the vulnerabilities of the citizenry. Fineman’s 
vulnerability theory offers a launching pad for conceiving of how the 
legal system might better acknowledge and account for vulnerability.  
Lawyers comprise a fundamental aspect of the legal system,5 so 
an important target for analysis is lawyers’ conduct: to reimagine the 
legal system is to reimagine the role of lawyers. Part I.B examines the 
ethic of zeal, one of the fundamental principles of the legal 
profession. Lawyers balance the role of zealous advocate with those 
of officer of the court and public citizen. When the obligations of 
these roles conflict, the standard expectation is for lawyers to 
prioritize the interests of their clients but stay within the bounds of 
the law. 
Part I.C questions whether the ethic of zeal should be applied 
evenly in every case. It is generally assumed that lawyers must act as 
neutral partisans,6 exercising the utmost zeal regardless of the client’s 
 
 2. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ 
ETHICS § 1.05, at 8 (2d ed. 2002) (describing “the client not as ‘this other person, over 
whom I have power,’ but as ‘this other person whom I have the power to help’ ”); William 
H. Simon, The Dark Secret of Progressive Lawyering: A Comment on Poverty Law 
Scholarship in the Post-Modern, Post-Reagan Era, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1100, 1110 
(1994) (“[T]he concern with lawyer oppression of clients has increased, while the scale of 
material and organizational ambitions has declined.”). 
 3. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 1.05, at 8. 
 4. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the 
Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 1–2, 19 (2008). 
 5. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY, at xvii (1988) 
(“[W]e encounter the legal system in the form of flesh-and-blood human beings . . . . For 
practical purposes, the lawyers are the law.”).  
 6. See William H. Simon, Commentary, Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice 
and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 29, 37. 
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social position or moral standing, but perhaps the neutral approach 
deserves reexamination. Substantive equality might be furthered by 
variability in the exercise of zeal. 
To investigate these topics in greater detail, Part II analyzes a 
specific scenario in which a lawyer assists a client in obtaining welfare 
benefits to which the client may be “technically ineligible.”7 Deborah 
Rhode, who first described the scenario, proposes that prioritizing the 
interests of the client above formal law is defensible in part because 
the client is poor.8 Her example provides support for the notion that 
zeal should vary based on the social position of the client. On the 
other hand, the standard conception of the lawyer’s role suggests a 
uniform approach to zeal, and tinkering with that approach could 
introduce moral judgments that lawyers would prefer to avoid. After 
considering potential challenges and other perspectives on the 
variability of zeal, the Article turns to the task of envisioning how 
increased zeal on behalf of vulnerable clients could further the pursuit 
of equal justice. 
Client vulnerability should influence how lawyers interpret their 
obligations and ration their efforts. Three key forms of vulnerability 
justify the use of heightened zeal: (1) the absence of market power to 
purchase legal representation; (2) the absence of political power to 
shape law; and (3) the presence of basic human needs. Part III of the 
Article proposes consideration of these factors and offers an initial 
sketch of how they might be operationalized. The Article concludes 
that substantive equality requires consideration of these factors of 
vulnerability and heightened zeal on behalf of vulnerable clients. 
I.  SHOULD VULNERABILITY INFLUENCE ZEAL? 
A. The Vulnerability Consideration 
Imagine that our legal system were structured to acknowledge 
and account for the vulnerabilities of the persons within it. Martha 
Fineman has articulated a theory that assists with undertaking this 
thought experiment.9 She highlights the inescapability of vulnerability 
in the human condition and the essential function of social institutions 
 
 7. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 77 (2000). 
 8. Id. at 77–80. 
 9. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Equality, Autonomy, and the Vulnerable Subject 
in Law and Politics, in VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL 
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS 13, 13 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter VULNERABILITY]; Fineman, supra note 4, at 1. 
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shaping and responding to it.10 Fineman interprets vulnerability not as 
the condition of certain populations but as a universal condition that 
is mediated by social institutions.11 She offers an ambitious theory 
that not only frames vulnerable subjects in physical and social 
contexts, but also suggests that consideration of vulnerability is 
fundamental to the pursuit of substantive equality.12 
The following three aspects of Fineman’s vulnerability theory 
will be relevant. First, Fineman identifies vulnerability as a universal, 
rather than unusual, aspect of the human condition: 
[T]he concept of vulnerability is sometimes used to define 
groups of fledgling or stigmatized subjects, designated as 
“populations.” . . . In contrast, I want to claim the term 
“vulnerable” for its potential in describing a universal, 
inevitable, enduring aspect of the human condition that must be 
at the heart of our concept of social and state responsibility.13 
Fineman views universal vulnerability as stemming from our physical 
“embodiment” and the fact that we are all at constant risk of harm 
due to the potential for disease or conditions of our physical 
environment.14 
Second, vulnerabilities range from person to person, due not 
only to physical differences but also to economic and social factors. 
Vulnerability “is greatly influenced by the quality and quantity of 
resources we possess or can command.”15 Although vulnerability 
cannot be eradicated, “society can and does mediate, compensate, 
and lessen our vulnerability through programs, institutions, and 
structures.”16 Society’s institutions produce, or fail to produce, social, 
political, and economic resilience, conferring privilege and 
disadvantage.17 
Third, the public bears a responsibility to build social institutions 
in consideration of vulnerability and how different social structures 
influence it.18 Specifically, a formal approach to equality should give 
way to a theory of substantive equality in which the state takes 
 
 10. Fineman, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 11. See id. at 8–10. 
 12. Id. at 19–22. 
 13. Id. at 8; see also Fineman, supra note 9, at 20–21 (explaining that vulnerability is 
universal and constant). 
 14. Fineman, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
 15. Id. at 10. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Fineman, supra note 9, at 24. 
 18. Fineman, supra note 4, at 10, 12–13. 
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significant responsibility for the condition in which it finds and leaves 
all of its subjects.19 
Fineman contrasts her notion of the “vulnerable subject” with 
what she views as the “autonomous and independent subject asserted 
in the liberal tradition.”20 She describes the liberal subject as 
“indispensable to the prevailing ideologies of autonomy, self-
sufficiency, and personal responsibility, through which society is 
conceived as constituted by self-interested individuals with the 
capacity to manipulate and manage their independently acquired and 
overlapping resources.”21 Challenging this image, she argues that 
“autonomy is not a naturally occurring characteristic of the human 
condition, but a product of social policy.”22 Consideration of the 
vulnerable subject, as opposed to the liberal subject, therefore leads 
to a substantive, rather than formal, approach to equality.23 
A substantive approach to equality carries significant 
implications for how best to design legal and social institutions.24 This 
approach “concentrates on the structures our society has and will 
establish to manage our common vulnerabilities” and increases the 
state’s responsibilities with respect to people’s vulnerabilities.25 
Fineman suggests “imagin[ing] responsive structures whereby state 
involvement actually empowers a vulnerable subject.”26 
This challenge prompts the inquiry of how the legal system might 
better empower vulnerable subjects. As lawyers comprise a 
fundamental aspect of the legal system,27 an important target for 
analysis is lawyers’ conduct. One of the fundamental principles of 
lawyering is the ethic of zeal. 
B. The Ethic of Zeal 
A lawyer balances the roles of zealous advocate, officer of the 
court, and public citizen. In the face of competing duties, lawyers 
 
 19. Id. at 19–22. 
 20. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 2; see also Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna 
Grear, Introduction: Vulnerability As HeuristicAn Invitation to Future Exploration, in 
VULNERABILITY, supra note 9, at 1, 2, 4 (describing “the mythical (and equality 
destructive) autonomous liberal subject of neoliberal rhetoric” and “the rational, 
property-owning actor at the heart of classic liberalism”). 
 21. Fineman, supra note 4, at 10. 
 22. Id. at 23. 
 23. See id. at 2–4.  
 24. See Fineman & Grear, supra note 20, at 2.  
 25. See Fineman, supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 26. Id. at 19. 
 27. See LUBAN, supra note 5, at xviii. 
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traditionally prioritize the role of zealous advocate within the bounds 
of the law and governing disciplinary rules.28 Scholars have debated 
whether and to what extent zeal on behalf of clients should trump 
concern for third parties. Below is a brief exploration of the ethic of 
zeal. 
Zeal refers to the dedication with which the lawyer pursues her 
client’s interests.29 The ethic of zeal is one of abiding tenacity and 
loyalty. The famous quotation from Lord Henry Broughman 
instructs: 
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one 
person in all the world, and that person is his client. To save 
that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and 
costs to other persons, and, amongst them, to himself, is his first 
and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard 
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring 
upon others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an 
advocate, he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it 
should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.30 
This portrait of the lawyer depicts a zealous partisan whose 
devotion to her client supersedes all other social obligations.31 In 
Monroe Freedman’s most famous and most controversial depiction of 
the lawyer as a zealous advocate,32 he concludes that in some cases it 
is proper for a lawyer to cross examine for purposes of discrediting 
the credibility of a witness who the lawyer knows to be telling the 
truth; put a witness on the stand who the lawyer knows will commit 
perjury; and give a client legal advice that the lawyer believes will 
tempt the client to commit perjury.33 Freedman acknowledges that 
many lawyers find clever ways to avoid coming to terms with these 
situations when they arise; they shield themselves from knowledge34 
or withdraw.35 Freedman argues, however, that lawyers should 
confront these dilemmas directly and acknowledge when other ethical 
 
 28. See Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to 
Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 
771–72 (2006). 
 29. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 4.1, at 79. 
 30. Id. at 79–80 (quoting 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 3 (James Cockcroft & Co. 
ed., 1874)). 
 31. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY 
SYSTEM 9 (1975).  
 32. Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966). 
 33. Id. at 1475, 1477–78, 1480–82. 
 34. Id. at 1472. 
 35. Id. at 1475–76. 
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obligations must give way to the ethic of zeal.36 Although Freedman’s 
interpretation of the ethic of zeal may appear extreme, to a large 
degree he spells out a standard conception codified in professional 
ethics rules and exemplified by lawyers’ conduct across the country.37 
The justifications for prioritizing zeal on behalf of clients are as 
deep-seated as justifications for the adversary system itself. The 
adversary system’s structure embodies constitutional values—
protection of individual dignity, pursuit of truth through the 
expression of diverse perspectives, and promotion of democratic 
government38—and constitutional rights that lawyers could jeopardize 
if they subordinated zeal to other social goals. Beyond sacrificing 
individual clients’ procedural and substantive rights, this could 
arguably thwart the functioning of the legal system.39 
Untrammeled zeal does, however, present drawbacks. Scholars 
like William Simon,40 David Luban,41 and Deborah Rhode42 have 
argued convincingly that lawyers’ obligations to third parties, both 
individuals and society at large, should receive greater recognition. If 
lawyers take “superaggressive”43 zeal too far, it might result in social 
harms.44 These could include negative effects on truth-seeking, 
disregard for and damage to third parties, and diminished respect for 
lawyers and the legal system.45 As Simon has highlighted, the zealous 
partisan “will employ means on behalf of his client which he would 
not consider proper in a non-professional context . . . [such as] 
deception, obfuscation, or delay.”46 Without commitment to a shared 
set of rules about truth-telling, there can be no atmosphere of respect 
 
 36. Id. at 1469, 1482. Serving as a zealous advocate does not necessarily require 
litigating every issue, but rather shaping one’s actions with promotion of the client’s 
interests as the primary goal. See Nicole Martorano Van Cleve, Reinterpreting the Zealous 
Advocate: Multiple Intermediate Roles of the Criminal Defense Attorney, in LAWYERS IN 
PRACTICE: ETHICAL DECISION MAKING IN CONTEXT 293, 293, 300 (Leslie C. Levin & 
Lynn Mather eds., 2012). 
 37. See LUBAN, supra note 5, at xxi.  
 38. Kathryn A. Sabbeth, Towards an Understanding of Litigation As Expression: 
Lessons from Guantánamo, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1487, 1495, 1501 (2011). 
 39. See FREEDMAN, supra note 31, at 1–4.  
 40. See Simon, supra note 6, at 135–37. 
 41. See LUBAN, supra note 5, at xix–xxiii. 
 42. RHODE, supra note 7, at 66–70. 
 43. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Civil-Criminal Distinction in Professional 
Responsibility, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 165, 166 (1996). 
 44. Id. at 180–81. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Simon, supra note 6, at 36. 
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or trust, and no social solidarity.47 The resulting precariousness could 
threaten the rule of law and even the fabric of society. Not 
surprisingly, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Rules”) 
state that lawyers must contain their zeal within the bounds of the 
law.48 
Where lawyers have discretion in the application of zeal, 
however, the Rules provide limited guidance. Lawyers must balance 
their roles as zealous advocates, officers of the court, and public 
citizens, but the Rules suggest that this is relatively easy; the drafters 
claim that the exercise of zeal is “harmonious” with other obligations, 
such as candor toward tribunals and fair dealing with third parties.49 
Moreover, while the Rules reference lawyers’ “special responsibility 
for the quality of justice,”50 they provide little indication of how 
justice might influence the exercise of zeal. The Rules do not indicate 
that the social position of a client may enter the calculus. The next 
section of this Article introduces the proposition that it should. 
C. Neutrality 
In the standard conception of the lawyer’s role, the principle that 
goes hand-in-hand with zeal is neutrality.51 Neutrality requires that 
the lawyer represent clients regardless of the lawyer’s views of the 
client or the client’s ends. The duties of neutrality and zeal are 
interrelated: the lawyer’s combined obligation is the zealous pursuit 
of the client’s goals without moral judgment.52 
Consideration of a client’s vulnerability might threaten the 
principle of neutrality. To suggest that lawyering for different clients 
might be approached differently appears at odds with a constitutional 
framework that espouses government neutrality. The attempt to 
 
 47. Cf. TRUDY GOVIER, SOCIAL TRUST AND HUMAN COMMUNITIES 89 (1997) (“To 
think that people can do without trust in professional relationships is to misunderstand the 
need for judgment and decent human relationships in the transmission and application of 
professional knowledge. . . . An ethos of distrust is counter-productive in professional 
institutions and relationships. It makes people and their projects worse than they could 
be.”). 
 48. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2012). 
 49. Id. The Preamble also describes lawyers’ obligation to “show respect for the legal 
system and . . . to uphold legal process,” and lawyers’ roles as “public citizen[s].” Id. 
 50. Id.  
 51. See LUBAN, supra note 5, at 7, 11, 52; Simon, supra note 6, at 36–37. 
 52. See LUBAN, supra note 5, at 6–7. 
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identify, let alone regulate, a substantive conception of public good 
may be controversial in a liberal democracy like the United States.53 
Rationing zeal based on an assessment of vulnerability creates 
the possibility that lawyers would reserve their energies for clients 
whom the lawyers deem deserving.54 This might undermine some 
clients’ freedom to choose their activities and to enjoy equal 
treatment under the law.55 It might seem undemocratic, given lawyers’ 
government-granted monopoly on legal services.56 
Yet lawyers do ration their efforts. They ration their zeal 
between their clients and the potential clients they reject.57 Lawyers 
make these decisions when they accept or reject individual clients 
and, less directly but no less importantly, when they establish fees and 
other barriers to service. Given that lawyers’ zeal is already rationed, 
it is worth considering whether factors other than purchasing power 
should influence that rationing. 
A key question of this Article is whether the vulnerability of a 
client can justify heightened zeal—acts of zeal that might otherwise 
cross ethical boundaries. This inquiry is inspired partly by Monroe 
Freedman’s observation that criminal defense lawyers must 
compromise the interests of third parties more frequently than most 
members of the bar will admit.58 Freedman’s loyalty to his clients is 
 
 53. For a critique of the neutrality principle in liberalism, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 3–24 
(1996).  
 54. See Robert P. Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, but Do, Care About 
Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 48–50 (2010). 
 55. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, §§ 3.04–.05, 3.07, at 56–59, 64–67; see also 
LUBAN, supra note 5, at 7 (“Otherwise, ‘If the saint sues the sinner, the sinner shall not be 
defended. If it should happen that a saint wrongs a sinner, the sinner cannot sue the 
saint.’ ” (quoting Letter from David Dudley Field to Samuel Bowles (Jan. 5, 1871), in 
ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 257–58 (1976))); 
RHODE, supra note 7, at 73 (arguing that representing guilty defendants protects the 
integrity of the legal system and restrains prosecutorial power).  
 56. See Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE GOOD LAWYER: 
LAWYERS’ ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS 150, 151 (David Luban ed., 1983) 
(acknowledging that if lawyers refuse to provide services based on moral qualms, persons 
with lawful claims may be denied access to services). But see id. (suggesting that the 
reasons for holding lawyers morally accountable outweigh legal access problems). Given 
lawyers’ obligation to provide access to the law regardless of the substantive morality of 
the client or the client’s goals, lawyers cannot be morally responsible for the outcomes of 
their legal representation. For this reason, some scholars describe the principle of 
neutrality as a principle of “nonaccountability.” See, e.g., id. at 150. 
 57. See Monroe H. Freedman, Response, The Lawyer’s Moral Obligation of 
Justification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 111, 116–17 (1995) (arguing that lawyers do have a moral 
obligation to justify their choices of clients, even if they must devote equally robust zeal to 
all they choose to represent). 
 58. See Freedman, supra note 32, at 772, 777. 
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deeply compelling. Yet, fidelity to the client above other parties is 
only as good as the reason for it. It is difficult to believe that the legal 
system serves fundamental values like individual human dignity when 
the market allocates lawyers to individuals on an uneven basis.59 In a 
society where the vulnerability of the citizenry and their access to the 
legal system vary, the system may require adjustment to provide 
equal justice for all. Promoting substantive equality may require 
acknowledging and compensating for the social positions of 
vulnerable clients. Below is a discussion of one way lawyers might do 
so. 
II.  TEST OF ZEAL FOR VULNERABLE CLIENTS 
The vulnerability of a client could potentially operate as a thumb 
on the scale for zealous partisanship and against obligations to third 
parties. To explore this idea in concrete terms, Part II of this Article 
will borrow from a case previously described by Deborah Rhode. The 
discussion will review her and other scholars’ observations and will 
provide an initial analysis of the relevance of vulnerability to a 
lawyer’s zealous representation of a client. 
A. Rhode’s Case of the Vulnerable Client 
While working as a law student in a legal services office that 
represented poor people, Rhode encountered the following 
situation.60 A client sought assistance with an application for welfare 
benefits.61 Rhode and her supervisors faced the question of whether 
and how to provide such assistance.62 They found this decision 
ethically and legally complicated because they believed that the client 
earned income that disqualified her from such benefits.63 
 
 59. See Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
589, 611–12 (1985) (suggesting that partisanship loses social value on individualist grounds 
when partisans are allocated by market forces). 
 60. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 77. 
 61. Id. at 76–77. At the time, the benefits were provided under Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children. See Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Program (“TANF”), 
64 Fed. Reg. 17720, 17720 (Apr. 12, 1999) (“[T]he Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families . . . . replaces the national welfare program known as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children . . . .”). Similar benefits would be provided today under Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families. See id. 
 62. RHODE, supra note 7, at 77. 
 63. Id. (“It appeared obvious . . . [that the client] had undisclosed income that would 
have made her technically ineligible for benefits.”). That this case takes place outside the 
context of litigation makes it no less significant. The lawyer’s obligation of zeal applies to 
all representation, not just courtroom advocacy; there is always a potential adversary 
because any act of drafting or negotiation could influence the client’s position in later 
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As background, Rhode explains that the financial subsidies 
provided under the governing welfare regulations were “grossly 
inadequate.”64 The benefit levels were unrealistically low and did not 
actually provide sufficient funds for a family to subsist in the then-
current economy.65 As a result of the mismatch between the benefit 
levels provided by the regulations and the level of income required 
for survival, poor people commonly supplemented welfare income 
with additional earnings but chose not to report the additional 
earnings.66 
Rhode asserts that the client in this particular scenario needed 
the welfare support to finish an educational program.67 Rhode posits 
that the educational program could have helped the client “escape 
poverty and achieve long-term financial independence.”68 Therefore, 
Rhode maintains, this client is a person the welfare laws were 
intended to support.69 
Rhode interpreted the client’s position to be one the formal law 
does not support.70 Rhode understood the client not to be legally 
entitled to the benefits because of her independent income.71 The 
dilemma she and her supervisors faced was “whether to provide 
assistance” with a benefits application that would help the client 
“maintain benefits to which she probably was not entitled.”72 
Rhode presents this factual scenario in the context of a 
discussion of the advocate’s role in the adversary system. She 
articulates two types of cases that present ethical challenges for 
advocates.73 The first is the use of justifiable means for unjust ends.74 
She offers an example of an attorney raising a statute of limitations 
defense although the defendant experienced no prejudice as a result 
of the plaintiff’s delay in bringing suit.75 The second type of case, 
more relevant to the discussion here, is the use of unjust means for 
 
litigation. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 4.01, at 80. Moreover, all legal advice 
assists with negotiating social relations, thereby potentially increasing a client’s relative 
social power. 
 64. RHODE, supra note 7, at 76. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 76–77. 
 67. Id. at 77. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 71. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
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justifiable ends.76 Rhode identifies this as the “classic dilemma of 
‘dirty hands.’ ”77 The dilemma of “dirty hands” is not unique to the 
practice of law—for example, it is common in politics—but it may 
raise special problems for lawyers, whose position carries special 
duties to uphold the law, in spite of moral reasons to subvert it.78 
Rhode presents the factual scenario above as an example of a 
situation in which a client’s position is morally but not legally 
justified. The question for the lawyer is whether to assist the client, 
and thereby subvert the law, for moral reasons. Though she avoids 
saying it explicitly, Rhode suggests that her supervisor did so.79 In this 
sense, the supervisor arguably used unjust meansassisting a client 
with violating the letter of the lawto achieve a just outcome: 
supporting a poor woman who was using the benefits for support 
while pursuing an education that might eventually allow her to 
support herself independently.80 The supervisor’s resolution involved 
“selective ignorance”: she assisted the client while avoiding the 
acquisition of information that would have put her in the position of 
“knowingly” assisting in the preparation of an application that 
included inaccurate statements of fact.81 Rhode defends this choice, 
proposing that, so long as their own conduct is not illegal, lawyers 
may82 pursue results that are morally but not legally justified.83  
Rhode buttresses her argument by emphasizing social context.84 
She highlights that the “dirty hands” dilemma appears in particularly 
 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 76. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 78. 
 80. Id. at 77–78. It is unclear why the client’s path toward financial independence 
should influence the analysis. Perhaps Rhode believes the legislature intended welfare 
benefits to be temporary, but, if we set aside the requirements of formal law, assisting a 
client to maintain the means of survival might be intrinsically good, regardless of the 
client’s educational or financial plans.  
 81. Id. at 78. 
 82. Note that Rhode’s proposal is a permissive one; it is not a requirement. 
 83. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 77–78. In explaining this approach, Rhode divorces 
the conduct of the client from the conduct of the lawyer: she implies that a lawyer could 
lawfully assist with unlawful conduct. See id. This may create a very fine line for a lawyer 
to walk. See Ted Schneyer, Reforming Law Practice in the Pursuit of Justice: The Perils of 
Privileging “Public” over Professional Values, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1831, 1844 n.79 
(2002) (“[T]hey might have committed a crime and would have violated ethical bans on 
knowingly assisting clients in crimes or frauds.” (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1982); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) 
(1983))). 
 84. RHODE, supra note 7, at 77–78. 
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compelling forms in the practice of poverty law.85 A better solution to 
the tension between formal law and human needs is often unavailable 
in the context of representing poor people.86 The letter of the law 
tends not to favor the poor.87 Lawyers representing poor people tend 
to be dependent for their own incomes on funders who limit lawyers’ 
political activities, hampering lawyers’ own efforts to correct the law’s 
injustices through democratic means.88 Finally, poor people present 
lawyers with time-sensitive needs of survival, which cannot wait for 
legal reform.89 Rhode therefore concludes that such circumstances 
“can justify partisan practices that would be indefensible in other 
contexts.”90 
The case study above highlights how social realities shape the 
context in which lawyers operate. It underscores the need for 
flexibility and creativity when interpreting lawyers’ duties, given 
clients’ varied social positions. It hints at the possibility that lawyers 
should adjust their level of zeal in consideration of client 
vulnerability. 
B. Challenges for Variability of Zeal 
The notion of heightened zeal for vulnerable clients will meet 
stiff resistance. The traditional conception of the lawyer as a neutral 
partisan mandates that the lawyer’s obligation of warm zeal operates 
with equal strength and purpose regardless of a client’s financial 
circumstances or other aspects of the social context.91 The lawyer 
must always use all reasonably available means, within the law and 
 
 85. Id. at 76. While she does not define poverty law, it is likely Rhode meant “the 
legal statutes, regulations and cases that apply particularly to the financially poor in his or 
her day-to-day life.” Lillian Salinger, Poverty Law: What Is It?, 12 LEGAL REFERENCE 
SERVICES Q., no. 2–3, 1992, at 5, 6. Traditionally, this has been understood to include an 
intersecting web of civil law topics such as health care law, housing law, education law, 
elder law, family law, and welfare law. Id. at 6, 13. Today, more legal services offices 
include programs focused on consumer law, immigration law, domestic violence, 
employment law, and other areas. See, e.g., Civil Practice, LEGAL AID SOC’Y, 
http://www.legal-aid.org/en/civil/civilpractice.aspx (last visited May 1, 2015). 
 86. RHODE, supra note 7, at 78–79.  
 87. Id. at 78 (“To suggest that poverty lawyers could rectify injustices in welfare rules 
through political initiatives is to ignore the forces that gave rise to those rules in the first 
instance. Such suggestions also overlook the statutory prohibitions on political activity and 
welfare reform litigation by government-funded legal aid lawyers.”). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 78–79. 
 90. Id. at 79. Rhode suggests this may be “an imperfect solution, but we live in an 
imperfect world.” Id. at 78. 
 91. Monroe H. Freedman, How Lawyers Act in the Interests of Justice, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1717, 1726–27 (2002).  
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governing ethical regulations, to advance the client’s interests.92 The 
traditional approach to zeal is mandatory, not permissive,93 and does 
not allow for flexibility in degree.94 
As Monroe Freedman describes it, the question in Rhode’s 
welfare scenario95 is simply whether assisting the client with her 
application is in her interest and lawful.96 The means to be employed 
as part of the lawyer’s zealous advocacy should not be limited by the 
lawyer’s moral judgment but only by the client’s interests and the 
law.97 Freedman believes that lawyers should counsel clients about 
the moral and legal consequences of their actions,98 but once a client 
has defined her interests, the lawyer must serve them.99 
In the case of assisting a client to submit a welfare application 
despite suspicion that the application includes false information, 
Freedman suggests that the Model Rules actually condone Rhode’s 
supervisor’s tactic of selective avoidance.100 He explains that the 
Model Rules define knowledge as “actual knowledge,” which in turn 
requires “an outright admission from a client.”101 Additionally, the 
Model Rules put no burden on the lawyer to investigate.102 Although 
he notes that the Code of Conduct would put more stringent limits on 
the lawyer’s conduct,103 Freedman suggests that the supervisor’s 
 
 92. Id. at 1727. 
 93. Freedman’s assessments of what lawyers must do and what they may do with 
respect to acting zealously are often indistinguishable, perhaps due to the fact that he 
believes lawyers’ ethics are rooted in the Bill of Rights. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra 
note 2, at vii; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (2012) (identifying 
within the Model Rules and comments a combination of imperatives whose violation 
creates cause for professional discipline, discretionary rules defining areas for attorneys to 
exercise professional judgment, and mere guidance). 
 94. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 2, § 4.05, at 88 (“For a lawyer to represent 
her client less than zealously would . . . warrant professional discipline.”). 
 95. Freedman suggests that there is not a question in this scenario because the 
governing rules permit the conduct contemplated. See infra notes 100–04 and 
accompanying text. 
 96. See Freedman, supra note 91, at 1727. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. Note, however, that Freedman believes that the choice of whom to represent is 
a moral decision, and social context may influence that decision. Freedman, supra note 57, 
at 116–17. Neither Rhode nor Simon emphasizes this factor, but in the welfare benefits 
scenarios that they present, each client is already a client, not merely a prospective client. 
See RHODE, supra note 7, at 77; WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A 
THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 148 (2000). 
 100. See Freedman, supra note 91, at 1725. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1725 & n.49. 
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chosen conduct is perhaps not so controversial at all and, in fact, is 
rather accepted by the legal establishment.104 
Yet this conclusion means the interpretation of knowledge 
should be the same in the representation of wealthy clients. Herein 
lies Freedman’s objection to Rhode’s contextual approach to lawyers’ 
conduct. Freedman points out that the “evasive strategies” she 
embraces on behalf of poor clients, such as “selective ignorance,” are 
the same strategies she criticizes when employed on behalf of 
wealthier clients.105 For example, Rhode criticizes truth-thwarting 
games played by corporate defense counsel during discovery.106 
Freedman argues that Rhode embraces a double-standard: her 
perspective leads to different rules for lawyers of the poor and 
lawyers of the rich.107 
As a practical matter, selective application of rules based on 
moral judgments could harm those persons Rhode aims to protect.108 
With respect to the welfare scenario, Freedman points to right-wing 
pundits who view women receiving welfare assistance as immoral.109 
He further suggests that the subjectivity of this morality consideration 
can permit any lawyer to claim that her client is morally righteous and 
therefore deserving of assistance by way of evasive strategies.110 
Freedman worries that lawyers for the powerful would exploit 
Rhode’s approach at least as frequently as lawyers for the 
powerless.111 
 
 104. Freedman does not seem to think avoidance is generally the wisest approach, in 
part because lawyers need full information to best represent their clients’ interests. 
Freedman, supra note 32, at 1470 (“It is . . . essential to maintain the fullest uninhibited 
communication between the client and his attorney, so that the attorney can most 
effectively counsel his client and advocate the latter’s cause.”). Freedman would likely 
conclude that the better approach is, with eyes wide open, to counsel the client regarding 
the moral and legal implications of the conduct but then, if it can be done within the 
confines of the law as aggressively interpreted, assist her. 
 105. See Freedman, supra note 91, at 1724–26. 
 106. RHODE, supra note 7, at 86–88. 
 107. See Freedman, supra note 91, at 1724 (citing RHODE, supra note 7, at 79); see also 
Schneyer, supra note 83, at 1847 (arguing that there is no social consensus on the moral 
principles animating Rhode’s theory, and therefore her approach provides no firm 
guidelines for ethical behavior). 
 108. Freedman, supra note 91, at 1726–27. 
 109. See id. at 1726. 
 110. Id. at 1726–27; see also Schneyer, supra note 83, at 1847 & n.96 (critiquing 
“theories of legal ethics . . . driven by the aim of enlisting the legal profession in the 
pursuit of one political perspective at the expense of other perspectives within mainstream 
American politics” (citing Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 11, 19–20 (1991))). 
 111. Freedman, supra note 91, at 1726. Rhode also recognizes this possibility. See 
RHODE, supra note 7, at 78 (“Given the economic and psychological pressures of practice, 
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Freedman insists on a uniform standard under which all lawyers 
act with full zeal but within the bounds of the law. Although his vision 
of the lawyer’s zeal is famously robust,112 Freedman does not 
acknowledge any tension between zeal and formal law.113 On the 
contrary, he borrows from the Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility to define the terms of the discussion so that obligations 
to clients and to the law are coterminous: 
Unfortunately, the word “overzealous” is sometimes used 
rhetorically (and without definition) to attack the ethic of 
zealous representation. Since zealous representation involves 
“seek[ing] the lawful objectives of [the] client through 
reasonably available means permitted by law and the 
Disciplinary Rules,” . . . we should define “overzealous” as 
conduct that goes beyond what is permitted by law and the 
Disciplinary Rules. Under that definition, I too disapprove of 
overzealous representation.114 
For Freedman, lawyers serve justice precisely by serving their own 
clients’ interests zealously within the rule of the law, thereby 
protecting clients’ dignity and autonomy.115 His preferred solution for 
addressing any immorality in the conditions facing poor clients is to 
increase the number of lawyers serving them.116 Freedman does not 
 
attorneys may too often convince themselves that fundamental values and irrational rules 
permit covert noncompliance [with governing law and rules]. If the bar’s history is any 
guide, the clients most likely to benefit from such decision making would not be the poor 
and oppressed.”). 
 112. William H. Simon, “Thinking Like a Lawyer” About Ethical Questions, 27 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 1 (1998) (“Suppose you had to pick the two most influential events in 
the recent emergence of ethics as a subject of serious reflection by the bar. Most likely you 
would name the Watergate affair of 1974 and the appearance a few years earlier of an 
article by Monroe Freedman [entitled Three Hardest Questions].”). 
 113. See Freedman, supra note 91, at 1722 n.27. He does, however, acknowledge 
tensions between zeal and other ethical mandates; for example, he boldly claims that zeal 
towards one’s client must sometimes trump the obligation of candor. See generally 
Freedman, supra note 28, at 771–72 (“[Z]ealous representation . . . may sometimes require 
the lawyer to violate other disciplinary rules.”). 
 114. See Freedman, supra note 91, at 1722 n.27 (alteration of quoted material in 
original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
DR 7-101(A) (1982)). Of course, Freedman’s description of the ethic of zeal is far more 
complex, robust, and animated in his other work. Freedman would likely claim that the 
two statements are consistent and it is a matter of how one interprets the bounds of the 
law. He interprets them as permitting, but also requiring, the lawyer to take aggressively 
zealous steps on behalf of the client. 
 115. See id. at 1727. 
 116. Id. (expressing support for increased funding of legal services to expand access to 
lawyers); see also Freedman, supra note 57, at 116–17 (arguing that the choice of whom to 
represent is a moral one). 
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agree with adjusting the activities of the lawyers who already provide 
that service.117 
An underlying premise of this perspective is that lawyers pursue 
equal justice by treating all clients the same. Variation in lawyers’ 
duties in consideration of clients’ vulnerability would compromise this 
approach to equality. That approach, however, suggests a formal, 
rather than substantive, view of equality. The next section will present 
a different, substantive approach. 
C. Zeal for Substantive Justice 
An interesting model for varying zeal can be found in the work 
of William Simon.118 Simon prioritizes substantive justice, and 
although he does not directly address the question of zeal for 
vulnerable clients, his approach to substantive justice offers important 
insights for this discussion. Simon interprets the law to embody 
fundamental values,119 which sometimes trump formal legal 
requirements.120 Simon views the obligation to pursue substantive 
justice as central to lawyers’ ethics,121 and believes lawyers should be 
permitted to engage in that pursuit even when formal law appears to 
erect barriers to it.122 Simon’s view of substantive justice suggests zeal 
should vary—sometimes lawyers should circumscribe their zeal even 
more sharply than formal law requires, but sometimes they should 
engage in zealous advocacy beyond what formal law might permit. 
This approach to how a lawyer for vulnerable clients pursues 
justice may be clarified by comparison to the perspectives described 
above. Freedman would say pursuit of justice is the same in any 
representation: zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law (and of 
course the lawyer may argue in good faith for changes in the law).123 
Rhode would say the lawyer for the vulnerable client may use 
contextual analysis and creative lawyering to take steps beyond what 
she might do for a less vulnerable client.124 Simon does not suggest 
that vulnerable clients are categorically entitled to enhanced zeal, but, 
in practice, the application of Simon’s philosophy often leads to that 
result. 
 
 117. Freedman, supra note 91, at 1727 (arguing that evasive strategies are not “[t]he 
best way to help the poor and the oppressed”). 
 118. SIMON, supra note 99, at 7–10. 
 119. Id. at 138. 
 120. Id. at 77. 
 121. Id. at 138. 
 122. Id. at 77. 
 123. See supra Part II.B. 
 124. See supra Part II.A. 
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For Simon, the degree of the lawyer’s zeal should be 
circumscribed not by formal law, but by substantive justice. Simon 
recognizes that substantive justice may not be identical to a particular 
client’s interests, and where there is a conflict, Simon insists that the 
lawyer prioritize the former.125 This means that in some cases the 
lawyer must stop short of taking all technically lawful steps to 
advance the client’s interests.126 In such cases, the lawyer will act less 
zealously than Freedman would require. 
Simon’s approach, however, also contemplates circumstances in 
which the lawyer might act more zealously than under Freedman’s 
model.127 Simon’s ethical lawyer is not bound by formal law, but by 
the law as it embodies fundamental values.128 Freedman is careful to 
define zeal so that it is in harmony with lawful conduct,129 but Simon’s 
limiting principle is different.130 
Like Rhode, Simon analyzes lawyers’ obligations in the context 
of social and economic structures. In his book, The Practice of Justice, 
Simon explores the topic of financial planning.131 He discusses 
advising two clients, one poor and surviving on welfare benefits, and 
the other employed in a hotel, earning a handsome salary.132 After a 
complicated analysis, Simon concludes that assistance for the former 
client is more justified.133  
For Simon, whether the attorney should offer financial planning 
advice turns on substantive justice. He suggests that, in the pursuit of 
substantive justice, the lawyer has an obligation to consider the 
purposes of a regulation.134 The clearer those purposes are, and the 
closer to fundamental legal values those purposes are, the more 
closely the lawyer must adhere to the substance of the regulation.135 
 
 125. SIMON, supra note 99, at 7–9, 26, 50–52. 
 126. See, e.g., id. at 145–46 (“The Dominant View [of legal ethics] tends to license the 
manipulation of form to defeat purpose . . . [and] to permit any client goal not plainly 
precluded.”).  
 127. Compare id. at 77 (arguing that there are circumstances that “may warrant the 
lawyer to go beyond [the bounds of the law]”), with Freedman, supra note 91, at 1727 
(arguing that lawyers must zealously advocate for clients “within the rule of law”). 
 128. SIMON, supra note 99, at 77. 
 129. See Freedman, supra note 28, at 771–72 & n.6; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT pmbl. (2012) (defining obligation of zeal as harmonious with lawyers’ other 
obligations). 
 130. SIMON, supra note 99, at 77–108. 
 131. Id. at 148. 
 132. Id. at 146–49. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. In explaining Simon’s work, I use the term “regulation” to include any statute 
or regulation that potentially governs the situation. 
 135. Id. at 145–46. 
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This requires the lawyer to abstain from manipulating formal law to 
violate the spirit of the regulation.136 Evasive strategies, like those that 
Rhode identifies as permissible in certain contexts,137 would be 
improper under Simon’s view when the regulation’s purposes are 
clear and closely aligned with fundamental legal values.138 Where the 
purposes of a regulation are less clear or where those purposes 
threaten a fundamental legal value, however, the lawyer may 
interpret the regulation formally and comply with them only 
technically.139 Rhode’s evasive strategies would therefore be available 
if the purposes are less clear or would threaten a fundamental value. 
Simon generally finds advice to assist with tax avoidance140 more 
troubling than do many other lawyers and theorists of legal ethics.141 
He demonstrates this in his discussion of the hypothetical situation 
involving the lawyer for the “highly paid hotel manager.”142 The 
manager could reduce his tax liability by arranging to live at the hotel 
in exchange for a reduction in pay, because the in-kind shelter benefit 
would be tax exempt.143 The lawyer believes that the purpose of the 
relevant tax provision is to benefit employees required to live onsite 
in spite of their own presumed preference for larger cash payments.144 
After a thorough description of how the lawyer might analyze the 
purposes of the relevant tax provision, Simon concludes that if the 
lawyer believes the regulatory purpose is “clear and not problematic,” 
and advising the client to initiate the arrangement with his employer 
 
 136. Id. at 145. For Simon, it also requires that the lawyer often correct, rather than 
take advantage of, the mistakes or absence of information of third parties. See, e.g., id. at 
141–43. 
 137. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 78. 
 138. SIMON, supra note 99, at 145–46. 
 139. Id. at 146. 
 140. The term “avoidance” is intended here in an ordinary, non-legal sense. Generally, 
“tax avoidance” is distinguished from “tax evasion,” with the former being recognized as 
lawful and the latter as unlawful. See Stuart P. Green, What Is Wrong with Tax Evasion?, 9 
HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 221, 222–23 (2009); see also Assaf Likhovski, The Duke and the 
Lady: Helvering v. Gregory and the History of Tax Avoidance Adjudication, 25 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 953, 993 (2004) (tracing the historical development of the recognized distinction 
between avoidance and evasion). In this discussion, however, the term “tax avoidance” is 
not meant to indicate that the conduct is lawful or unlawful, but simply that it is a form of 
financial planning or other activities for the purposes of avoiding or reducing tax liability. 
 141. Compare SIMON, supra note 99, at 142–43 (proposing that a lawyer should not use 
“a new tax avoidance device” even if “there is a nonfrivolous argument for its legality”), 
with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2012) (limiting lawyers’ zeal to asserting 
claims that are “not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, 
modification or reversal of existing law”). 
 142. SIMON, supra note 99, at 146. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 147. 
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would circumvent the statutory purpose, the lawyer should refrain 
from suggesting it.145 The lawyer should circumscribe her zeal to 
promote substantive justice. 
Yet Simon acknowledges the need for a different approach when 
representing a client with basic human needs at stake.146 He presents a 
hypothetical case in which a client receives public assistance and lives 
in her cousin’s home at no charge, but the free shelter threatens her 
public assistance eligibility.147 The regulations governing public 
assistance provide that receipt of shelter “at no cost” constitutes 
“income in kind” and will reduce the client’s monthly benefits by one 
hundred and fifty dollars.148 The lawyer recognizes, however, that the 
client could technically avoid receiving shelter “at no cost,” and could 
thereby avoid the corresponding reduction in benefits, if the client 
gives her cousin a nominal amount of money each month.149 Simon 
applies his concept of substantive justice to the scenario.150 To 
demonstrate how a lawyer might apply the theory, he walks through 
one possible analysis of the legislative history and purpose of the 
governing regulations.151 He suggests that the benefit reduction in the 
regulations was likely intended to reflect that persons provided with 
shelter have less of a need for financial support.152 Additionally, he 
finds some evidence that crafters of the regulation probably did not 
consider financial planning.153 On the other hand, financial planning is 
not explicitly prohibited, so perhaps the language of the regulation 
reflects a compromise between different legislative agendas.154 Simon 
asks us to imagine that, after this careful process of consideration, the 
attorney concludes that the legislative purpose is unclear.155 These 
circumstances, Simon explains, suggest that the attorney should treat 
the regulation formally.156 This means the lawyer should advise the 
client about the financial planning option. Simon further suggests 
that, even if the lawyer had found the regulation’s purpose to be 
clear, if the lawyer concluded that this purpose endangered 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 146–49. 
 147. Id. at 148. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 148–49. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 148. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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fundamental legal values, she could still be justified in providing the 
financial planning advice.157 
How does Simon justify this conclusion? He suggests that the 
lawyer might determine that the client’s interest “in a minimally 
adequate income is a value of exceptional legal importance”;158 that 
the assistance grant does not suffice to meet that interest; and that the 
financial planning would help to bridge the gap.159 Simon asserts that 
the shelter reduction provision frustrates the fundamental legal value 
he has identified.160 Therefore, the lawyer might conclude that a 
financial planning arrangement like the one contemplated is not 
prohibited by the regulation unless the regulation states so 
explicitly.161 In the absence of an explicit prohibition, the lawyer 
should advise the client on the financial planning option to avoid the 
benefits deduction and maintain a benefits level closer to the minimal 
level she needs.162 
Whether the interest in a minimally adequate income is an 
exceptionally important legal value—or is even commonly accepted 
as a legal value at all in the United States—is controversial. Simon 
finds that “there is substantial authority” for the proposition,163 but 
admits that the Supreme Court has provided mixed support.164 He 
also suggests looking to other legal standards, such as federal poverty 
guidelines, for an indication of the legally recognized minimum 
income needed for survival.165 Simon acknowledges that the 
conclusion about the analysis is debatable but insists there is sufficient 
authority for an attorney to conclude that the shelter reduction 
provision contradicts a fundamental legal value.166 On this basis, the 
attorney could interpret the regulation formally and assist the client 
to evade its substance.167 
Simon’s approach to the vulnerability of clients, like Rhode’s, is 
contextual. He does not advocate for a separate framework for the 
ethics of representing vulnerable clients, but he allows clients’ 
 
 157. Id. at 148–49. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 149. 
 160. Id. at 148. 
 161. Id. at 149. 
 162. Id. at 148–49. 
 163. Id. at 149. 
 164. Id. at 149, 234–35 n.13 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260–61 (1970); 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)). 
 165. Id. at 149. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
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vulnerability to influence the lawyer’s analysis when the law gives 
indications that addressing such vulnerability promotes fundamental 
values.168 With respect to the level of zeal due to poor clients, Rhode 
suggests that not all poor clients are entitled to “unqualified 
advocacy,” but that poverty is not irrelevant if it affects the justice of 
the claims.169 Rhode and Simon both acknowledge that these 
contextual approaches leave significant room for lawyers’ 
discretion.170 Rhode would choose to limit that discretion by requiring 
that the lawyers’ choices be “defensible under accepted ethical 
principles,”171 while Simon would set the limit at broader legal 
values.172 
Simon implies that addressing basic human needs might be one 
of those values.173 In his scenario involving the client who lives with 
her cousin, Simon suggests that the client’s need for minimally 
adequate income might be one such form.174 In advocating the pursuit 
of substantive justice even in violation of formal legal requirements,175 
Simon draws an analogy to nullification by judges and juries.176 He 
explains that such nullification, properly understood, is not a 
demonstration of lawlessness, but an act of interpreting what the law 
substantively requires.177 Moreover, he argues, even if lawyers have a 
stronger obligation to respect and uphold the law than do other actors 
in the legal system, “obligation to ‘law’ may require violation of some 
legal norms in order to vindicate more basic ones.”178 Therefore, one 
could recognize a client’s interest in a minimally adequate income as a 
fundamental legal value that could provide sufficient reason to 
override the dictates of formal law. Notwithstanding other ethical or 
legal considerations, the client’s need for a minimally adequate 
income might justify the attorney’s zeal. 
 
 168. As thinkers like Robin West have highlighted, this approach is actually a 
conservative one; it suggests that moral and activist goals must rest on existing legal 
values. Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal Legal World, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 973, 981 (1999). This approach leaves little space to challenge unjust laws 
or to shift legal values. 
 169. RHODE, supra note 7, at 79. 
 170. Id.; SIMON, supra note 99, at 149. 
 171. RHODE, supra note 7, at 79. 
 172. Id.; SIMON, supra note 99, at 149. 
 173. SIMON, supra note 99, at 148–49. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. at 77. 
 176. Id. at 84–98, 107–08. 
 177. Id. at 84. 
 178. Id. at 106. 
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The above analysis offers several possible answers to the 
question of whether and to what extent clients’ vulnerability may or 
should influence the lawyer’s ethic of zeal. Rhode’s case study 
highlights the social context in which lawyers work.179 It reveals 
reasons to consider vulnerability and gives clues as to when a client’s 
vulnerability may be relevant. The inquiry is enriched by the 
perspective of Simon, who highlights the significance of fundamental 
values.180 He reminds us that the law does embody substantive, non-
neutral values. Such values can and should inform lawyers’ conduct. 
Building on these insights, the next Part will begin to tackle how to 
incorporate substantive values into the representation of vulnerable 
clients. 
III.  A NEW APPROACH TO ZEAL ON BEHALF OF VULNERABLE 
CLIENTS 
The standard conception of lawyers’ role cautions us to avoid 
double standards in zealous advocacy, to exercise zeal within the 
bounds of the law and accepted norms, and, if dissatisfied with the 
formal laws, to seek to change them.181 The realities of lawyering in a 
society with an unequal distribution of power and resources, however, 
provide reason to question this approach. The commonality and 
variability of vulnerability make it necessary to develop flexible and 
creative interpretations of the law. To promote and protect an equal 
society, the legal system ought to recognize people as it finds them 
and empower people in the positions they occupy. As agents of the 
legal system, lawyers should account for the differences between 
clients. Lawyers should consider client vulnerability when rationing 
their efforts. Client vulnerability will, in some cases, tip the balance 
towards increased zeal. 
Drawing on themes underscored in the case studies discussed 
above, this third and final Part of the Article will identify particular 
forms of client vulnerability that justify increased zeal on the part of 
lawyers. Each identified category serves to acknowledge and 
compensate for an aspect of vulnerability that requires attention in a 
system of equal justice. The key forms of vulnerability are: (1) the 
absence of market power to purchase legal services;182 (2) the absence 
 
 179. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 78.  
 180. See SIMON, supra note 99, at 148. 
 181. RHODE, supra note 7, at 77. 
 182. Id. at 78 (highlighting that poor clients are represented by lawyers supported 
through public funds). 
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of political power to shape the law;183 and (3) the presence of basic 
human needs.184 Below is a brief sketch of the purpose and definition 
of these categories. 
A. Absence of Market Power to Purchase Legal Services 
The frequent absence of market power to purchase legal services 
creates a dynamic of underrepresentation that calls out for correction. 
In the aggregate, people without the capacity to purchase legal 
services generally have fewer lawyers than those able to pay. As a 
result, certain interests and positions are overrepresented, while 
others are underrepresented.185 For example, it is not surprising that 
in a housing court where twelve percent of tenants are represented 
and ninety-eight percent of landlords are represented, judges’ 
perceptions of the law reflect the landlords’ views.186 This makes 
zealous advocacy on behalf of the tenants all the more vital. 
The absence of market power to purchase legal services is a 
factor that can be defined in concrete terms without posing a 
fundamental challenge to the neutral partisan ethic.187 To evaluate 
whether a client has the market power to purchase legal services, one 
 
 183. Id. (“To suggest that poverty lawyers could rectify injustices in welfare rules 
through political initiatives is to ignore the forces that gave rise to those rules in the first 
instance.”). 
 184. Id. at 78–79 (describing “clients with pressing economic survival needs and 
compelling moral claims”). 
 185. A notable exception is the client whose case is unusually attractive to high-profile 
pro bono counsel. See, e.g., Sabbeth, supra note 38, at 1529–30 (describing pro bono 
counsel for Guantánamo detainees). 
 186. See CMTY. TRAINING & RES. CTR. & CITY-WIDE TASK FORCE ON HOUS. 
COURT, INC., HOUSING COURT, EVICTION AND HOMELESSNESS: THE COSTS AND 
BENEFITS OF ESTABLISHING A RIGHT TO COUNSEL, at iv, 20 (1993) (“Only 11.9 percent 
of the tenants in Housing Court were represented by attorneys. Landlords were 
represented by an attorney in 97.6 percent of the cases.”); see also Richard L. Abel, Why 
Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 681 (1981) (“In the vast 
majority of transactions in every consumer sales or loan contract . . . one party is 
unrepresented.”); Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation 
of Lawyers’ Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 79, 118 
(1997) (describing mismatch between represented creditors and unrepresented debtors). 
 187. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1420–21 (1984) 
(arguing that non-profit organizations supporting corporate interests should not be 
recognized as public interest law firms under tax exemption law because they do not 
increase access for underrepresented groups or interests); Louise G. Trubek, Public 
Interest Law: Facing the Problems of Maturity, 33 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 417, 
421–22 (2011) (describing the Ford Foundation’s use of “ ‘market failure’ economic 
literature” to justify the development of non-profit, public interest law firms in neutral 
terms). 
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could consider whether the client paid for legal representation.188 This 
consideration could be adjusted to account for whether the person 
took out a loan to pay, whether the person paid a limited amount 
based on a sliding scale, or whether the fee was paid through a 
statutory fee-shifting provision rather than from the client’s 
independent resources.189 
Clients with the means to pay lawyers will always have the 
services of lawyers for as long as they wish to pay. Poor clients who 
depend on volunteer lawyers and lawyers employed by overburdened 
public and non-profit offices experience heightened vulnerability.190 
The latter group of lawyers must divide their time between many 
clients. Pro bono attorneys provide representation only if the lawyers 
view the clients or causes as worthy.191 Even lawyers committed full 
time to the representation of poor clients depend for their own 
financial support on the conception of the clients’ needs as 
worthwhile in the eyes of public or private funders.192 These combined 
factors put the clients in a particularly precarious position compared 
with that of clients who can purchase legal services on the market.  
Increased zeal on behalf of clients without the market power to 
purchase legal services complements the legal system. Persons unable 
to afford legal representation are generally less likely to receive any 
representation. When represented, they are likely to be represented 
less aggressively than those able to pay handsome sums.193 The 
lawyers that do represent such persons should therefore use the 
opportunity to aggressively promote such clients’ views. The zealous 
 
 188. This could of course include clients who have agreed to and are expected to pay, 
even if they have not yet handed over actual payment. 
 189. For further discussion of the relevance of payment to the definition of public 
interest lawyering, see generally Kathryn A. Sabbeth, What’s Money Got to Do with It?: 
Public Interest Lawyering and Profit, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 441, 442–43 (2014). For 
discussion of the relevance of payment to the definition of litigation as expression, see 
Sabbeth, supra note 38, at 1531–32. Note that many middle-class persons are unable to 
afford counsel, so the absence of the market power to purchase legal services does not 
imply that a client is “poor.” See David C. Vladeck, In re Arons: The Plight of the 
“Unrich” in Obtaining Legal Services, in LEGAL ETHICS STORIES 255, 258–59, 261, 284–86 
(Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban eds., 2006) (describing the absence of legal services 
for the middle class). 
 190. See Susan D. Carle, Power As a Factor in Lawyers’ Ethical Deliberation, 35 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 115, 146 (2006) (“[W]here lawyers are representing relatively poor or 
disadvantaged clients, the typical moral hazard produced by self-interest is to do too little 
in light of clients’ inability to pay for superior services.”). 
 191. See Deborah M. Weissman, Law As Largess: Shifting Paradigms of Law for the 
Poor, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 828 (2002) (challenging the interpretation of legal 
services for the poor as charity rather than rights). 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 117 (2004). 
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representation of parties usually underrepresented in the legal system 
serves to bolster the diversity of viewpoints expressed in the system.194 
This improves the system both as a matter of fairness195 and through 
enrichment of the marketplace of ideas.196 To the extent that the 
adversary system and the ethic of zeal serve values such as that of 
individual dignity, the marketplace of ideas, and democratic 
government, it makes sense to put a thumb on the scale on behalf of 
those who tend not to have their voices heard.197 
B. Absence of Political Power to Shape Law 
The absence of political power to shape the law is a second form 
of vulnerability that should tip the balance towards increased zeal on 
behalf of a client.198 Political power informs the basic ground rules of 
the legal system, as those with power design the legal structure to fit 
their experiences and expectations. Political power further influences 
the framing and direction of political debates and potential for 
change. People who lack the capacity to influence legislatures are 
limited in their capacity to shape and change formal law.199 That lack 
of political accountability in the creation of the formal law should 
influence how lawyers approach their obligations in relation to that 
law. Representing clients who lack political power requires more 
flexibility and creativity in interpretation. Increased zeal is justified 
because the lack of political power diminishes clients’ capacity to 
advance their interests through alternative means.200  
 
 194. See Carle, supra note 190, at 141–42. 
 195. Id. at 141 (using the Rawls difference principle to create “[a] rule that grants less 
advantaged clients access to justice through the provision of zealous, client-centered 
advocacy”). 
 196. Id.  
 197. See Sabbeth, supra note 38, at 1496–1502.  
 198. In a social system that tolerates a financial influence on politics, imbalances of 
political power only compound the problems of market underrepresentation, given the 
overlap between the vulnerable populations underrepresented in both contexts. See 
generally Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 412 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Going forward, corporations and unions will 
be free to spend as much general treasury money as they wish on ads that support or 
attack specific candidates . . . . The Court’s ruling thus dramatically enhances the role of 
corporations and unions . . . in determining who will hold political office.”). 
 199. See Bertrall L. Ross II & Su Li, Measuring Political Power: Suspect Class 
Determinations and the Poor, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 21–
23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2571756 (synthesizing literature demonstrating 
unequal political power between the poor and rich). 
 200. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546–49 (2001) (holding that a 
restriction on speech of poor people’s lawyers violated the First Amendment in part 
because of a lack of alternative channels for advocacy). 
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The absence of political power can be defined using existing 
literature on equality theory.201 New research by Bertrall Ross II and 
Su Li on suspect classes offers a particularly useful approach.202 In 
contrast to the Supreme Court’s recent emphasis on the presence of 
laws favoring a group’s interests, these scholars note that factors other 
than political power, such as legislators’ ideology, may result in 
legislation favorable to a group.203 They therefore suggest 
consideration of the degree of organized lobbying advancing the 
group’s interests; political responsiveness to the group’s anticipated 
preferences; voter turnout; and descriptive representation in 
politics.204 Additional research could be done to further refine these 
factors, but they provide an excellent starting point. 
It should be recognized that the focus on political power requires 
recognizing clients as members of social groups. This may seem to cut 
against the common emphasis on individual rights in lawyering ethics. 
Yet vulnerability is largely a socially constructed phenomenon and 
addressing it requires an analysis grounded in a social context. 
C. Presence of Basic Human Needs 
The third form of vulnerability that should tip the balance 
towards increased zeal is the presence of basic human needs. This 
aspect may be the most important. The consideration of basic human 
needs suggests that attorneys may and should fight harder when 
certain interests are at stake. Meeting basic human needs is an 
essential prerequisite for an equal society. When those basics are 
jeopardized, extra protection is warranted. 
It might seem intuitive that the higher the stakes for the 
individual, the more effort should be expended to protect those 
interests, but the current structure of the legal system suggests 
otherwise. Substantive and procedural rights often rank basic human 
needs below property rights. As just one example, many states 
expedite and streamline eviction proceedings; removing a tenant from 
her home is, procedurally, faster and easier than recovering a nominal 
sum of money.205 The defendant’s potential deprivation of shelter 
 
 201. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without Political Power”: Gays and 
Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 1003–04 
(2014). 
 202. See Ross & Li, supra note 199 (manuscript at 1–5). 
 203. Id. (manuscript at 27–28). 
 204. Id. (manuscript at 49–51). 
 205. Compare, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-214 (2013) (scheduling trials of small claims 
actions to begin five to thirty days after service of summons), and id. § 7A-217 (describing 
three permissible means of serving defendant in small claims action and one additional, 
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receives relatively little attention in the design of the adjudication 
system. To increase zeal on behalf of clients with basic needs at stake 
is to suggest a different order of priorities. 
The priorities should not be difficult to define. A number of 
sources provide material helpful for identifying basic human needs. In 
addition to international human rights laws and the constitutions of 
various other nations,206 we also have a more familiar source. Almost 
a decade ago, the American Bar Association (“ABA”) adopted a 
resolution advocating the appointment of counsel in civil matters 
where “basic human needs are at stake.”207 The ABA resolution 
defines basic human needs to include five categories: shelter, 
sustenance,208 safety, health, and child custody.209 At the least, this 
seems a fine starting point for articulating the basic human needs that, 
when threatened, put a client in a position of vulnerability that 
justifies a heightened level of attorney zeal on his or her behalf. 
 
*** 
 
Vulnerability turns on multiple social and physical factors. The 
presence of basic human needs, the absence of the political power to 
change formal law, and the absence of the market power to purchase 
legal representation each play a part. Scholars and advocates must 
analyze lawyers’ obligations and social role contextually. Equality 
 
easier option that applies only for plaintiffs in eviction cases), with id. § 42-29 (requiring 
only two-day notice of eviction hearing and more minimal requirement for obtaining 
jurisdiction over tenant than other defendants). 
 206. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). See generally Colin J. Beck, Gili S. Drori, & John W. 
Meyer, World Influences on Human Rights Language in Constitutions: A Cross-National 
Study, 27 INT’L SOC. 483 (2012) (surveying the constitutions of 189 countries for evidence 
of human rights language).  
 207. Am. Bar Ass’n, Report to the House of Delegates, Resolution 112A, at 1 (2006), 
available at 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_s
claid_06A112A.authcheckdam.pdf. The ABA resolution focuses on “basic” rather than 
“immediate” needs, the latter of which was Rhode’s term. Compare id. (“[T]he American 
Bar Association urges federal, state, and territorial governments to provide legal counsel 
as a matter of right at public expense to low income persons in those categories of 
adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake . . . .”), with RHODE, supra 
note 7, at 66 (arguing that “clients’ immediate needs dictate” the advocate’s role). Rhode 
may have been focused on immediacy to justify a lawyer’s choice to flirt with assistance 
fraud.  
 208. Sustenance is defined as income from various sources including benefits from 
government agencies and wages from private employment. Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 207, 
at 13.  
 209. Id.  
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does not necessarily mean treating a wealthy client the same as a 
much poorer one. In a system of justice, equality may instead require 
recognizing the differences in clients’ vulnerabilities and adjusting 
legal structures accordingly.210 
CONCLUSION 
The current reality for vulnerable clients is that their lawyers 
often face criticism and punishment for acts of zeal,211 while, at the 
same time, these lawyers lack the support needed to maintain levels 
of zeal remotely comparable to that expended for the privileged. The 
problem is not an ethical compunction of the lawyers for vulnerable 
clients but rather a limitation on time, energy, and resources.212 When 
calls are made for increased resources, this generally refers to 
increased funding.213 Indeed, a significant shift in funding could 
improve zeal on behalf of vulnerable clients. As some lawyers have 
argued, such shifts are necessary for lawyers and government funders 
to comply with their ethical and constitutional obligations.214 These 
arguments deserve our attention. 
At the same time, Fineman’s emphasis on designing social 
systems with vulnerable subjects in mind points toward more creative 
solutions. If we were willing to entertain the possibility of approaches 
to zeal adjusted for the vulnerabilities of clients, we might imagine 
new structures to facilitate it. Many of the existing facets of criminal 
procedure were crafted to support defense lawyers’ ability to 
advocate zealously for their vulnerable clients. In particular, 
 
 210. This is reminiscent of the famous Anatole France quotation: “The law, in its 
majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges . . . .” Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 23 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting JOHN COURNOS, A 
MODERN PLUTARCH 27 (1928)).  
 211. See Van Cleve, supra note 36, at 299, 309–12 (highlighting how judges and 
prosecutors threaten and punish lawyers for exercising zeal on behalf of poor clients); 
Karla McKanders, Professor, Univ. of Tenn. C. of L., Address at the North Carolina Law 
Review Symposium: Vulnerable Defendants in the Criminal Justice System (Oct. 10, 2014) 
(highlighting how judges punish zeal on behalf of vulnerable clients).  
 212. See RHODE, supra note 7, at 72–73 (“[T]he most common problem in criminal 
cases is under- rather than overrepresentation.”).  
 213. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 
22 (2009), available at http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_
justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (“Legal aid programs will need to have both the 
additional resources necessary to employ more staff and to enhance their efforts to engage 
the private bar in providing pro bono services.”). 
 214. See Matt Apuzzo, Holder Backs Suit in New York Faulting Legal Service for Poor, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/
nyregion/holder-backs-suit-in-new-york-faulting-legal-service-for-poor.html (describing suit 
seeking funds for public defenders). 
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asymmetry is built into the criminal process for the purpose of 
counteracting defendants’ vulnerability in relation to the state.215 
Perhaps other mechanisms could be fashioned, in the civil or criminal 
context, to acknowledge and compensate for social inequalities.216 
Given increasing inequalities between client populations, combined 
with the ongoing inequality in the distribution of lawyers, it is time to 
begin rethinking uniform standards of zeal. 
 
 215. See generally Anna Roberts, Asymmetry as Fairness: Reversing a Peremptory 
Trend, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2015) (articulating the benefits of an 
asymmetrical approach to allocating peremptory challenges between the prosecution and 
the defense).  
 216. These might include adjustments to rules of evidence, procedure, or ethics. 
